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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I propose a model of rational inattention where the choice
variable is a deterministic function of the exogenous variables, and still only a
nite amount of information is being used. This holds provided the choice vari-
able is discrete rather than continuous; that is, the mapping from the realization
of the exogenous variables to the endogenous ones is piece-wise constant.
Thus, limited information is now a source of lumpiness in behavior, rather
than a source of noise. A central result is that the mutual information between
the exogenous variable and the endogenous one is simply equal to the entropy,
in the usual discrete sense, of the endogenous variable.
The approach is illustrated with two applications: a general linear-quadratic
problem with a uniform distribution, and a simple static model of price-setting
where individual price setters face aggregate monetary shocks and idiosyncratic
productivity shocks.
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1 Introduction
In a series of seminal papers, Sims (2003,2006) has proposed a novel approach
to bounded rationality. It is based on the view that people face information
capacity constraints dened using Shannons (1948) theory of information.
More precisely, the number of bits that one can use to process the exogenous
variables (like income) into the endogenous ones (like consumption) is limited.
That informational requirement is dened by Shannons mutual information
concept, which tells us the amount of information obtained on a variable
when one observes another, correlated one.
As a consequence of that information constraint, the endogenous variable
is noisy compared to the optimal behaviour that would prevail absent an in-
formational constraint. Thus, is many applications (such as Luo (2008), who
studies a consumption problem, and the papers cited below on price-setting)
the agents rationally allocates this noise so as to maximize its utility subject
to the information capacity constraint. The more noisy is the endogenous
variable in a given zone of the distribution of exogenous variables, the less the
agent pays attention to that zone and the greater the informational capacity
left for processing other zones.
As pointed out by Sims, the reason why noise must inevitably arise is that
if the distribution of the exogenous variables is continuous, then an innite
amount of information would be needed to process a deterministic mapping
from the exogenous variables into the endogenous ones.
In some settings, the noise is inherent to the problem of measuring a signal
and the agentsinformational capacity is used to reduce such a noise. The
rational inattention theory then tells us, in some sense, how to optimally
design the noise so as to get the highest possible welfare subject to the
information capacity constraint.
In other settings, though, the result that behaviour adds noise to the
exogenous variables is unpalatable. If the realization of the latter is perfectly
observed then the agent would have to generate the noise articially, but
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then it is problematic to ignore the information needed to generate such
noise. It would then be more reasonable to assume that the behaviour of
the agent remains deterministic while the information processing constraint
prevents it from targeting the optimal behaviour. However, that is not what
is happening in the rational inattention literature.
In this paper, I propose an alternative approach to that issue. The idea
is that the choice variable may be a deterministic function of the exogenous
one and still make use of a nite amount of information if the choice variable
is discrete rather than continuous; that is, the mapping from the realization
of the exogenous variables to the endogenous ones is piece-wise constant,
reecting the fact that the agent can only elect a nite number of values for
the choice variable, because of the informational constraint.
Thus, limited information is now a source of lumpiness in behavior, rather
than a source of noise. The state space faced by the agent is partitioned into
clusters and all points in the same cluster yield the same action. Of course,
limited information is not the only source of lumpy behavior; it is well known
that there are other sources, such as xed or linear adjustment costs. But
the approach proposed here yields many potentially testable predictions: In
general, we expect that the greater the information processing ability of an
economic entity, the less lumpy its behavior.
Another central result (Section 2) is that the mutual information be-
tween the exogenous variable and the endogenous one is simply equal to the
entropy, in the usual discrete sense, of the endogenous variable. That is,
the mutual information does not depend on the exact mapping from the ex-
ogenous variable to the endogenous one but only on the probability weights
of the (discrete) distribution of the latter. This remedies some weaknesses
of the continuous notions of entropy which is used in the literature, which
makes it impossible to separate the, probability weights of the variables from
their actual values.
Sections 3 and 4 illustrate the kind of results that my approach would
deliver by applying it to two simple examples: a general linear-quadratic
2
problem with a uniform distribution, and a simple static model of price-
setting where individual price setters face aggregate monetary shocks and
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. This model delivers a lumpy price-setting
behavior where the number and size of clusters depends on the dispersion of
shocks and the rms information processing capacity. It is consistent with
recent micro-level evidence on reference prices found by Eichenbaum et al
(2008).
The literature that has studied this issue (in particular, Mackowiak and
Wiederholt (2009a,b), Paciello (2007)) uses Sims noisy approach and has
shown that under rational inattention prices were "sticky" in the sense that
the aggregate price level was not reacting one for one to the aggregate money
stock1. However, prices are not lumpy: even a small monetary shock will
generate a small (but non neutral) response of individual prices (one notable
exception is Moscarini (2004))2. Here, in contrast, rational inattention leads
to lumpy price-setting behavior; for prices to change, the shocks faced by
a rm must be large enough to trigger a move to a di¤erent cluster. As
discussed in Section 5, this makes a substantial di¤erence. In the noisy
approach, it is optimal to react less than one for one to monetary shocks
because one can only react to a noisy measure of those shocks, as in the
Lucas (1972) misperception model. Consequently, such underreaction also
prevails at the aggregate level. Here, though, no noise is introduced and
stickiness arises at the individual level because the same price is charge within
a cluster of realizations of the individual price setters relevant shock. But,
as in Caplin and Spulber (1986), such stickiness is greatly reduced in the
aggregate because of the contribution of the rms which move across clusters
1The same result is reached by Saint-Paul (2005) in a world where rms are irrational
and experiment alternative price-setting rules, while exerting local spillovers on each other.
2In that paper, lumpiness arises for di¤erent reasons than here. Time is continuous
and there is a constraint on the ow of information processed by the agent. the exogenous
variable follows a di¤usion process. A noisy signal of that variable can be obtained at a
cost. The cost structure of information is such that the signal will be drawn infrequently,
at discrete dates. Thus there is lumpiness "in time" rather than in the state space.
Consequently, the model is similar to that of Mankiw and Reiss (2002) sticky information
paper.
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as a result of a monetary shock.
It is important to note that while lumpiness is the only way to reconcile
limited mutual information with deterministic behavior, the converse is not
true. Depending on the objective function and the distribution of noise, the
support of the endogenous variable may either be discrete or continuous, as
recently found by Matejka (2008) and Matejka and Sims (2010), who provide
some partial but powerful su¢ cient conditions for discreteness to arise. Yet,
even in this case, it is always optimal to have a noisy behaviour, so that the
implications for aggregate price stickiness will resemble those of Mackowiak
and Wiederholt (2009a).
Section 6 provides a more general discussion and concludes.
2 Continous and discrete entropy and mutual
information
It is somewhat important to realize that there are two di¤erent concepts of
entropy. For a discrete distribution with n outcomes and probabilities pi;
i = 1; :::; n; we may dene entropy as
S =  
nX
i=1
pi log pi:
On the other hand, for a continuous distribution with density f(x); we
may dene entropy as
H(f) =  
Z
f(x) log f(x):dx:
The reason why the two concepts do not coincide is as follows. A discrete
distribution is always the limit of a sequence of continuous distributions,
as they become more concentrated around the discrete outcomes. However,
the continuous entropy H of those approximations does not converge to the
corresponding S: Instead, it converges to  1.
Take for example the extreme case where x = 0 with probability 1.
Clearly, S(x) = 0: This discrete distribution is the limit of the continuous one
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dened by density f"(x) = f(x=")="; for any density f() over ( 1;+1);
which is regular and has f(0) > 0; as " goes to zero (in terms of distribution
theory, these distributions converge to a Dirac function (x)). Furthermore,
H(f") = H(f) + log ";
so that
lim
"!0
H(f") =  1:
Entropy is lower, the more concentrated the distribution. For both dis-
crete and continuous distributions, the most concentrated one is when all the
mass is at a single point. But the lower bound of S is zero, while that of H
is -1:
Let us now turn to mutual information, which plays a key role in the
theory of rational inattention. We consider two random variables x and y:
Their densities are g() and f(); respectively. For any realization of x; we
denote by f(y j x) the conditional distribution of y and its entropy is
H(y j x) =  
Z
y
f(y j x) log f(y j x):dy:
This can be averaged over x; which allows to dene the conditional en-
tropy of y :
Hx(y) =
Z
x
H(y j x)g(x)dx:
Now it can be easily shown that the entropy of the joint distribution of
x and y; H(x; y); is such that3
H(x; y) = H(x) +Hx(y) = H(y) +Hy(x):
Consequently, we have that
H(y) Hx(y) = H(x) Hy(x) =M(x; y);
3In fact, that property is one of the axioms imposed by Shannon to derive his functional
form for entropy.
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which is the mutual information between x and y: This quantity tells us
how much knowledge of one variable reduces the entropy of the other, on
average. If the two variables are independent, then M(x; y) = 0: On the
other hand, if one had y = x; then the joint distribution is degenerate and
f(y j x) becomes equal to the Dirac function (y x): Hence all the H(y j x)
are equal to  1 and so is Hx(y): We then have that M(x; y) = +1: This
means that knowledge of x gives us an innite amount of information about
y: The same conclusion would be reached if instead of y = x; there was any
other mapping which allowed to retreive one variable from the other.
The theory of rational inattention, as proposed by Sims, assumes that
an agent receives a signal y (say, income), which must be processed into a
decision variable x (say, consumption): The agents ability to process infor-
mation is limited and that limit takes the form of a constraint on the mutual
information between the two variables:
M(x; y)  K:
Since M(x; y) = +1 if x is a deterministic function of y; this constraint
cannot be matched. The endogenous variable must be related to the ex-
ogenous one in a noisy fashion for the information capacity constraint to be
matched. In other words, processing a continuum of real values with perfect
precision requires an innite amount of information.
I now show that there is an important exception to that principle, and
this is the case when x; while being a deterministic function of y; only takes
a nite number values. There is then no longer a mapping from y to x:
While x can be retreived from y; the converse is not true. In such a case, the
mutual information between x and y remains nite, and is in fact equal to
the discrete entropy S of the random variable x:
Let us consider a collection of values of x; X = fx1; :::; xng; and assume
that any y is assigned to one of those values, called x(y): For any x 2 X; we
dene Tx = fy; x(y) = xg: To avoid manipulating innite quantities, I will
consider my deterministic assignment as the limit, for "! 0; of the random
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variable x dened by its conditional distribution:
f"(x j y) = 1
"
f^

x  x(y)
"

: (1)
Here again, f^() is any regular density such that f^(0) > 0: We are again
in a situation where the conditional of x is a Dirac, now around x(y); and
we approximmate it by a density which becomes increasingly concentrated
around x(y): To x ideas, one can just take the standard normal density for
f^():
Then the following can be proved:
Theorem 1  Let M(") be the mutual information between x and y if
x is distributed according to (1): Let S(X) =  
X
i
Pi logPi be the discrete
entropy of the random variable whose realization is xi; with corresponding
probability Pi = F (Ti): Then
lim
"!0
M(") = S(X):
Proof See Appendix.
The conditional entropy of x, if x is distributed as f"; is
Hy(x; ") =  
Z
y
f(y)
Z
x
1
"
f^

x  x(y)
"

log

1
"
f^

x  x(y)
"

dxdy
=  
Z
y
f(y)
Z
z
f^ (z) log

1
"
f^ (z)

dzdy
= H(f^) + log ":
So, clearly, lim"!0Hy(x; ") =  1:
Consider now the entropy of x; given "; denoted by H(x; "): The uncon-
ditional density of x is
g"(x) =
nX
i=1
1
"
f^(
x  xi
"
)F (Ti):
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Thus,
H(x; ") =  
Z
x
g"(x) log g"(x):dx
=  
nX
i=1
Z
x
1
"
f^(
x  xi
"
)F (Ti) log

1
"
f^(
x  xi
"
)F (Ti)

dx
=  
nX
i=1
Z
z
f^(z)F (Ti) log

1
"
f^(z)F (Ti)

dz
= H(f^) + log(") + S(X);
where S(X) is the discrete entropy of the random variable whose real-
ization is xi; with corresponding probability pi = F (Ti): Thus H(x; ") also
converges to  1 when " becomes nil, however, the mutual information re-
mains nite and
M(x; y; ") = S(X):
This is independent of " and equal to the discrete entropy of the random
variable xi: Obviously, it remains equal to that as "! 0: Hence the mutual
information of our assignment process is nite.
3 The linear-quadratic case
I now apply these ideas to the linear-quadratic case. In its simplest case, the
agent receives a continuous signal y with density f(y) and associated measure
F (M) =
R
M
f(y)dy; and wants to approximate it (in the least squares sense)
by a deterministic function x(y) which is constant over each subset of a nite
partition of the domain of y. Thus, using the preceding derivation for mutual
information in the discrete case, we can formulate the problem as follows (in
the sequel I will use natural logarithms in the denition of entropy. Thus K
is expressed in bits / ln 2):
(P) : min
n;S=(x1;:::;xn);x():R!S
E(x(y)  y)2
s:t: 
nX
i=1
F (x 1(xn)) lnF (x 1(xn))  K
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A rst property, which is unsurprising given the convexity of the loss
function, is that the optimum must be such that the sets x 1(xn); denoted
by Sn, have a convex interior.
Lemma 1 Consider a solution to (P). Then C(Sn) = Sn[@Sn is convex.
Proof see Appendix.
Lemma 1 tells us that the Sn must be intervals, except for closed subsets
of measure zero. In practice those subsets are irrelevant so we will focus on
solution that are piece-wise constant.
Lemma 2 xn = E(y j y 2 Sn): Therefore x(y) is non decreasing.
Proof: the rst part is straightforward from the optimal choice of xn: The
second derives from the fact that the Sns are intervals except for subsets of
measure zero.
I now focus on the case where f() is uniform over [0; 1]: It is then possible
to fully characterize the equilibrium:
Theorem 2 Assume f() is uniform. Then an optimal policy is such that
(i) The interval [0; 1] is partitioned into N adjacent intervals [yn; yn+1]; y0 =
0; yN = 1:
(ii) N = INT+(eK); where INT+(z) is the smallest integer m such that
z  m:
(iii) N   1 intervals have the same length ; where  is the smallest
solution to
 (N   1) ln  (1  (N   1)) ln(1  (N   1)) = K;
while the remaining interval has length 1  (N   1):
(iv)
 < 1=N < 1  (N   1)
(v) For y 2 [yn; yn+1]; x(y) = xn = yn+yn+12
(v) The resulting value function is V = (N   1)3 + (1  (N   1))3
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(vi) The arrangement of those intervals is irrelevant.
Proof  See Appendix.
Note that if capacity K is such that there is an integer number of bits,
then K = k ln 2 with k integer, and eK = 2k: In this important special case,
the optimal solution, quite naturally, consists in splitting the interval into 2k
intervals, since one needs exactly k bits to encode the actual interval to which
y is assigned. Furthermore, in this limit case where the capacity constraint is
marginally binding for N = 2k, all intervals will have the same length 1=2k:
If K= ln 2 is not integer, then partitioning into equal intervals is not opti-
mal. Instead, we have one more interval than the largest number of intervals
that would allow us to have an equal partition while meeting the informa-
tional constraint. We pick N   1 equally sized intervals of length ; and
the remaining one has length 0 = 1   (N   1) > :  is such that the
informational constraint binds with equality.
4 An application to price-setting
We now discuss the implications of the approach derived above for the prob-
lem of price setting and the e¤ects of monetary policy.
Let us consider the following static version of the standard new Keynesian
model4. There is a continuum of consumers-yeoman farmers of total mass 1.
They are indexed by i and they monopolistically supply an atomistic good
with the same index i: Thus there is also a continuum of goods of mass 1.
The utility function for individual j is
Vj = E ln
"Z 1
0
cijdi
 1
2

mj
p
1=2
X    zjx1+j
#
;
where E is the expectations operator, cij consumption of good i; mj money
holdings, p the aggregate price level, zj an idiosyncratic supply shock and xj
the supply of good j: The term in X  is a negative congestion externality,
where X is aggregate real output (dened below) and   0: This will
4See Weitzman (1985), Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).
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allow me to pick the value of  so as to focus on a special case which is
computationally much simpler, while what is lost by doing so is independent
of the point being illustrated here.
For simplicity, the aggregate price level that deates money holdings in
the utility function is assumed to be equal to the price index that is dual to
the aggregate consumption index
cj =
Z 1
0
cijdi
 1

:
p =
Z 1
0
p
  
1 
i di
  1 

:
The usual derivations concerning demand functions and aggregation are
made in the Appendix. We can show that each yeoman farmer maximizes
the indirect utility function given by:
E ln

p
  
1 
j   jp
  1+
1 
j

; (2)
where j is a composite shock dened by
j = zjM
+ p1  +

1  (3)
is a composite shock and the second term is treated as constant by the agent
since it is independent of his pricing policy.
From now on, I will assume that  is such that the composite shock does
not depend on the aggregate price level:  = 1 + =(1   ): Thus, j =
zjM
+1 
1  ; spillovers in price formation across rms are shut down, which
greatly simplies the analysis. It is then useful do dene  as  = +1 
1  :
As a benchmark, we can derive the exible price equilibrium with no
informational constraint where a di¤erent price is set for each realization of
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j: The FOC for price-setting is equivalent to
pj =

(1 + )j

1=
(4)
=

1 + 

1=
z
1=
j M:
Integrating we get the aggregate price level:
p =M ~z1=

1 + 

1=
;
where ~z is an aggregate of z dened as
~z =
Z 1
0
z
  
1 +
j dj
  1 +

:
Thus money is neutral, the aggregate price level is proportional to M;
and real aggregate output is constant and equal to
X =
Y
p
=
M
p
=

~z
1 + 

 1=
:
Output is lower, the larger the aggregate cost index ~z; the larger the
elasticity of the disutility of e¤ort ; and the lower the elasticity of demand
for the individual goods, i.e. the larger the markup over marginal cost 1=:
The New Keynesian literature takes this framework and imposes some
nominal price rigidity. I now introduce capacity constraints in processing in-
formation along the lines discussed above and derive the associated behaviour
of output and the price level.
Under rational inattention, people do not have the information processing
ability to pursue a rule like (4) for any value of j: Instead they are going to
pursue a rule such that the mutual information between pj and j satises
a capacity constraint. Let us assume that, as in the above analysis, they
pursue a discrete deterministic rule and partition the support of j into
intervals Ik = [k; k+1] such that a constant value of pj; denoted by pk, is
pursued within each interval. We assume k varies between 0 and N +1; with
0 = 0 and N+1 = +1:
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The distribution of the composite shock  has density
g() =
Z +1
0
f(M)M h(M )dM: (5)
Individuals select the number of intervals, their bounds and their associ-
ated price levels so as to maximize:
max
N;fk;k=1;:::;Ng;fpk;k=0;:::;Ng
U =
NX
k=0
Z k+1
k
g() ln

p
  
1 
k   p
  1+
1 
k

d; (6)
subject to the information capacity constraint
 
NX
k=0
 Z k+1
k
g()d
!
ln
 Z k+1
k
g()d
!
 K: (7)
An equilibrium is therefore a set fN; fk; k = 1; :::; Ng; fpk; k = 0; :::; Ngg
which maximizes (6) subject to (7). The solution to this problem then
delivers the aggregate price level as a function p(M) of the realization of
the aggregate money stock. Given M; a price-setter j is in interval Ik i¤
k  zjM < k+1; which occurs with probabilityH(k+1M ) H(kM ):
Therefore, the aggregate price level p(M) is given by
p(M) =
 
NX
k=0
 
H(k+1M
 ) H(kM )

p
  
1 
k
!  1 

; (8)
where by convention H(+1) = 1: This in turn allows to compute output
X = M=p(M): Note that the assumption made on  guarantees that the
environment faced by each price-setter only depends on the exogenous vari-
ables and not on the prices set by other agents5. This greatly simplies the
computations.
I solve for such an equilibrium numerically, performing global optimiza-
tion on all the possible partitions of the domain of  into a nite number of
5Otherwise, the shock  and its distribution g() would themselves depend on the aggre-
gate price level, and there would be no closed-form formula such as (8) for the latterone
would then need to search for a xed point equilibrium rather than just an optimum.
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intervals which match the informational capacity constraint. To keep things
tractable the possible values for the jump points have been discretized6.
Table 1 reports some summary statistics for the simulations. I start from
a benchmark numerical exercise where both f() and h() are log-normal, with
E lnM = E ln z = 0 and Var(lnM) = Var(ln z) = 1: The other parameters
were  = 1 and  = 0:5:
I rst start by simulating this economy for K = 1:2 and I gradually
loosen the information capacity constraint by increasing K: Table 1 reports
the corresponding number of clusters along with the variance of log output.
Figure 1 reports the behavior of output as a function of the monetary shock
M:We see that for a wide range of values of the money stock the curve is quite
at: despite the small number of clusters, heterogeneity due to idiosyncratic
shocks is enough to yield near neutrality at the aggregate level, a not unusual
result (Caplin and Spulber (1987), Caballero and Engel (1993), Burstein and
Hellwig (2007)). The curve is tilda-shaped: at small (resp. large) values of
M;most rms charge their minimum (resp. maximum) price, and an increase
in M boosts output. For intermediate values, a composition e¤ect creates
a force in the opposite direction, as some rms move to a cluster with a
higher price. This composition e¤ect creates a zone where money growth is
contractionary, which also happens in other models of price rigidity.
Figure 2 compares the atter portion of the output curve between a low
information (K = 1:2) and a high information (K = 1:5) regime. We see
that output is substantially atter in the latter case. Nevertheless, as Table
1 shows, for local increases in capacity, the variance of output may well go
up.
It is also interesting to look at the distribution of individual prices. They
are reported in Figures 3 (for K = 1:2) and 4 (for K = 1:6): The dimension
6More precisely, there are N possible values of k separated by a probability weight
of 1=( N + 1); i.e. if those eligible critical values are denoted by ~j ; j = 1; ::::; N; thenR ~j+1
~j
g()d = 1=( N + 1):
In the simulations, one has picked N = 20:
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of each rectangle along the y-axis is the price and along the x-axis it is the
probability weight associated with the corresponding interval of values of :
We see that the probability weights on each price are decreasing with the
price, meaning that price-setters are devoting more attention to situations
where the required price is higher. This is presumably due to the marginal
disutility of labor schedule: the utility cost of not paying attention to these
states is high because if one charges too low a price the labor input must be
very high7.
Entropy #of clusters Variance of output
1.2 4 0.17
1.3 5 0.18
1.4 5 0.187
1.5 5 0.1
1.6 6 0.1
Table 1.
Table 2 analyses the e¤ect of an increase in the variance of monetary
shocks on the distribution of individual prices for K = 1:4: We compare the
benchmark situation to one such that Var(lnM) = 2 and E(lnM) =  0:5
(Implying that E(M) is the same as in the benchmark). We see that the
increase in the variance of money shocks compells price-setters to devote
more attention to high realization of those shocks8: the upper-tail of the
distribution of the composite shocks is split into more, and ner, clusters,
while the rst interval is coarser. Also, the variance of log output increases
from 0.19 to 0.49.
Table 3c performs the reverse exercise of dividing the variance of monetary
shocks by 2, while again adjusting the mean log ofM to hold E(M) constant.
7This clearly rests on my assumption that demand must be met; this might not remain
realistic for very high realizations of the demand shock.
8That is because of the skewness of the log-normal distribution along with the increasing
marginal disutility of labor property. But for even larger increases in the variance of
money shocks, the price setters will also spend information capacity on the lower tail of
the distribution. Thus, for Var(lnM) = 4; cluster 1 has a minimal weight of 0.048.
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We see that the number of clusters is the same, and so is their size, but the
order is changed: the second cluster gets the biggest weight, while more
attention is paid to low realizations of the shock than before. The intuition
for this result is unclear.
Cluster Price Weight
1 0.95 0.43
2 1.96 0.24
3 3.74 0.19
4 7.0 0.095
5 23.63 0.048
Table 2a K = 1:4; benchmark.
Cluster Price Weight
1 0:76 0:52
2 1:67 0:19
3 2:84 0:095
4 4:99 0:095
5 8:66 0:048
6 47:4 0:048
Table 2b K = 1:4; Var(lnM) = 2 and E(lnM) =  0:5.
Cluster Price Weight
1 0:81 0:19
2 1:93 0:43
3 3:65 0:24
4 6:02 0:095
5 13:45 0:048
Table 2c K = 1:4; Var(lnM) = 0:5 and E(lnM) = 0:25
5 Implications for rigidity
As the preceding section makes clear, the quantized model only implies a
moderate degree of price rigidity at the aggregate level. By contrast, in a
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model where noisy behavior is allowed for, as that of Mackoviak and Wieder-
holt (2009a,b), the aggregate price level reacts less than one for one to mon-
etary shocks throughout the whole distribution of those shocks. The reason
is that this class of models is similar to the Lucas (1972, 1973) misperception
model. Information capacity constraints preclude price-setters from reacting
to the monetary shock. Instead, they can only react to a noisy signal of the
monetary shock. Given that, their optimal inference about the true realiza-
tion of the money stock will react less than one-for-one to that money stock,
as implied by Bayess Law. The only di¤erence between the Lucas misper-
ception model is that the noise is now designed optimally by the price-setters
17
so as to meet the information capacity constraint.9 In the aggregate, all in-
dividual prices react less than one-for-one to the money shock, and so does
the aggregate price level. These considerations apply to any model where
9As an aside, it is interesting to note that the reaction of prices to monetary shocks
is optimal conditional on the existence of noise. In other words, it is not the informa-
tion capacity constraint which is constraining that reaction to be suboptimally low, but
rather the noise itself (of course the noise is also a by-product of the information capacity
constraint). To see this, let us get back to the standard Gaussian linear-quadratic problem:
V = minE(x  y)2:
Assume y  N(0; 2y) and x = ay + "; where a is a reaction coe¢ cient and " the
endogenous noise, assumed normal with zero mean and variance 2" and orthogonal to y:
An optimality condition for x is
E(y j x) = x: (9)
This optimality condition pins down the correlation between x and y and it would hold if
one observed an exdogenous noisy signal of y: In our context, we have E(y j x) = a
2
y
2"+a
22y
:
Therefore the optimality condition (9) is equivalent to
a(1  a) = 
2
"
2y
: (10)
The value of the objective function is V = (a   1)22y + 2"; The mutual information
between x and y is
M(x; y) =
1
2
(log(a22y + 
2
")  log(2")): (11)
Thus our problem is equivalent to maximizing V subject to
a22y
2"
 K: (12)
Given this constraint, which involves a; it is not a priori obvious that the optimality
condition (9) should hold. In contrast, if x and y have a discrete distribution, M(x; y)
only depend on the probability weights of their joint distribution, and it is always possible
to pick the values of x while leaving M(x; y) unchanged so as to match (9). That M(x; y)
is not independent of the values of x because of the presence of a in (11) is a weakness of
the entropy concept applied to continuous distributions.
Nevertheless, since one picks both " and a optimally given the constraint (12), one has
one degree of freedom left to match the optimality condition (9)-(10), which turns out to
hold at the optimum. Indeed, at the optimum a = KK+1 and 
2
" =
K
(K+1)2
2
"; implying
that (10) holds.
This proves that the underreaction of x to y does not come from a failure of (9) that
would be the price to pay for matching the information capacity constraint. If this were the
case, it would be an artifact of the use of continuous entropy. Instead, this underreaction
is optimal given the presence of (endogenous) noise.
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agents are allowed to introduce noise in their policy functions in order to
save on information capacity. In particular, underreaction would also arise if
the distribution of the exogenous variable (y) were purely discrete or if that
of the endogenous variable (x) turned out to be discrete yet noisy conditional
on y as in Matejka and Sims (2010).
On the other hand, in the quantized model developed here, noisy policies
are precluded. The information capacity constraint is matched by lumping
the realizations of y in clusters within which the same policy is pursued. The
actual value of x within each cluster does not a¤ect the mutual information
between x and y; since, as we have seen, it only depends on the probability
weights of the discrete random variable x: Therefore, within each cluster
one will pick the optimal value of x conditional on being in that cluster,
ignoring the information capacity constraint. Consequently, if, in the absence
of information constraints, it is optimal for x to react one-for-one to y; this
will remain so in the quantized solution when one moves across clusters.
In the aggregate, money neutrality tends to arise in a similar fashion as in
Caplin and Spulber (1987): the large price adjustment of rms that are near
the frontier between two clusters tends to o¤set the price inertia of those
rms that remain in the same cluster. Thus the model, resembles a menu
cost model rather than the Lucas misperception model, and has much less
aggregate price stickiness.
6 Discussion
The general message of this paper is that information processing constraints
yield lumpy behavior. Thus, when the exogenous variables change, inat-
tention results in inaction, while in the standard approach it is associated
with inadequacy, i.e. embodies excess noise. In both cases, the endogenous
variable does not react enough to the exogenous one, although here there
will be a jump if one crosses the frontier between clusters.
The existence of lumpiness in the adjustment of economic variables has
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been documented in a number of areas. For example, Doms and Dunne
(1998), studying investment at the plant level, nd that "Many plants oc-
casionally alter their capital stocks in lumpy fashions. Of the plants in a
balanced panel, over half experience a capital adjustment of at least 37 % in
one year, and by 50% in two consecutive years". In the area of price setting,
Klenow and Kryvstov (2008) nd (table III) that individual price changes are
usually large, with a mean size of 14 %. Dhyne et al. (2006) report similar
ndings, along with substantial heterogeneity in the degree of lumpiness of
price adjustment across sectors. More recently, Eichenbaum et al. (2008),
using scanner data from the retail trade sector, nd that rms pick their
prices among a number of nite "reference" prices, and that the evidence is
consistent with the view that it is not costly to change prices as long as the
new price remains a reference price. This is exactly what happens in the
model described above. On the other hand, reference prices change infre-
quently, which may be interpreted as the outcome of a costly reoptimization
process in light of perceived changes in the underlying distribution of shocks
or in the technology for processing information.
Finally, evidence of lumpiness in employment can be found in Davis et al
(1996) or Caballero et al. (1997). The latter, in particular, found that the
distribution of employment changes is typically bimodal.
Of course, rational inattention is not the only reason why there could
be lumpiness. The above literature has mostly focused on xed and linear
adjustment costs and rational inattention and adjustment costs are not mu-
tually exclusive mechanisms. The rational inattention mechanism may be
of particular interest when large adjustment costs are implausible, as in the
area of price setting. Furthermore, a range of novel predictions may be gen-
erated regarding the determinants of lumpiness: The greater an economic
agents ability to process information, the less lumpy its behaviour. Thus
one may speculate that advanced in information technologies have reduced
lumpiness10, or that rms with a greater fraction of highly skilled workers
10This is the message of the empirical study by Bartel et al. (2005) inthe space of
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have less lumpy behavior this may help explain, for example, the nding by
Doms and Dunne (1998) that smaller plants have a more lumpy adjustement,
if one is willing to believe that smaller plants employ fewer skilled workers,
or by Dhyne et al (2006, g. 1) that some sectors (like gasoline) have much
less lumpy price adjustment than others (like haircuts).
product diversity.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1.
We have that
M(") = H(Y ; ") HX(Y ; "):
Let us compute Hx(y; "): We denote by p(y) the distribution of y and by
g(x) =
R
y
f"(x j y)p(y)dy the unconditional distribution of x: By Bayess law
the conditional distribution of y is f"(y j x) = f"(xjy)p(y)g(x) : Therefore we have
that
Hx(Y ; ") =
Z
x

 
Z
y
f"(x j y)p(y)
g(x)
log
f"(x j y)p(y)
g(x)

g(x)dx
=
Z
x

 
Z
y
f"(x j y)p(y) log f"(x j y)p(y)
g(x)

dx
=
Z
x

 
Z
y
1
"
f^

x  x(y)
"

p(y)

log

1
"
f^

x  x(y)
"

p(y)

  log
Z
u
1
"
f^

x  x(u)
"

p(u)du

dy

dx
= I1 + I2;
where
I1 =  
Z
x
Z
y
1
"
f^

x  x(y)
"

p(y) log

1
"
f^

x  x(y)
"

p(y)

dy

dx
and
I2 =
Z
x
Z
y
1
"
f^

x  x(y)
"

p(y)dy

log
Z
u
1
"
f^

x  x(u)
"

p(u)du

dx:
Let Hn(Y ) =  
R
Tn
p(y) log p(y)dy: Clearly,
P
nHn(Y ) = H(Y ): Further-
more,Z
y
1
"
f^

x  x(y)
"

p(y) log

1
"
f^

x  x(y)
"

p(y)

dy =
X
n
Z
Sn
1
"
f^

x  xn
"

p(y) log

1
"
f^

x  xn
"

p(y)

dy
=
X
n
1
"
f^

x  xn
"

(log

1
"
f^

x  xn
"

Pn +Hn(Y )):
25
Therefore,
I1 =  
Z
x
"X
n
1
"
f^

x  xn
"

log

1
"
f^

x  xn
"

Pn +Hn(Y )
#
dx
=  
X
n
Pn
Z
x
1
"
f^

x  xn
"

log

1
"
f^

x  xn
"

dx 
X
n
Hn(Y )
Z
x
1
"
f^

x  xn
"

dx
= log "+Hf^ +H(Y );
where Hf^ =  
R
z
f^(z) log f^(z)dz is the entropy of distribution f^() and the
last equality can be obtained straightforwardly by considering the variable
change z = x xn
"
:
Next, we have thatZ
y
1
"
f^

x  x(y)
"

p(y)dy =
X
n
1
"
f^

x  xn
"

Pn:
Therefore,
I2 =
Z
x
X
n
1
"
f^

x  xn
"

Pn log
 X
k
1
"
f^

x  xk
"

Pk
!
dx
=   log "+
X
n
Pn
Z
x
1
"
f^

x  xn
"

log
 X
k
f^

x  xk
"

Pk
!
dx
=   log "+
X
n
Pn
Z
z
f^(z) log
 X
k
f^

z +
xn   xk
"

Pk
!
dz:
It is then easy to see that since f^() is regular and since limjzj!+1 f^(z) = 0,
over any bounded interval [a; b] the family of functions v"() dened by v"(z) =
f^(") log
P
k f^
 
z + xn xk
"

Pk

converges uniformly to f^(z) log

f^ (z)Pn

:
Furthermore since for any z; log

f^ (z)Pn

 log
P
k f^
 
z + xn xk
"

Pk


logmaxz f^(z) = ; for any set S we haveZ
S
f^(z) log f^(z)+(logPn)
Z
S
f^(z)dz 
Z
S
f^(z) log
 X
k
f^

z +
xn   xk
"

Pk
!
dz  
Z
S
f^(z)dz:
Clearly we can always pick a and b such that for S = R   [a; b] the two
expressions in the right and left are arbitrarily small. This must also be true
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of the expression in the middle, for any ": By uniform convergence, we then
know that for " small enough
R b
a
f^(z) log
P
k f^
 
z + xn xk
"

Pk

dz is arbi-
trarily close to
R b
a
f^(z) log

f^ (z)Pn

: Since both
R
R [a;b] f^(z) log

f^ (z)Pn

(the left term in the inequality) and
R
R [a;b] f^(z) log
P
k f^
 
z + xn xk
"

Pk

dz
are arbitrarily small, we have shown that
R +1
 1 f^(z) log
P
k f^
 
z + xn xk
"

Pk

dz
is arbitrarily close to
R +1
 1 f^(z) log

f^ (z)Pn

:
From this we get that
lim
"!0
(I2 + log ") = lim
"!0
X
n
Pn
Z
z
f^(z) log
 X
k
f^

z +
xn   xk
"

Pk
!
dz
=
X
n
Pn
Z +1
 1
f^(z) log

f^ (z)Pn

:
=  Hf^   S(X):
Therefore:
lim
"!0
HX(Y ; ") = lim
"!0
log "+Hf^ +H(Y ) + I2
= Hf^ +H(Y ) Hf^   S(X)
= H(Y )  S(X):
Consequently, M(") = H(Y )   HX(Y ; ") converges to S(X) as " ! 0:
QED.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Consider y 2 Sn and y0 2 Sp for p 6= n: A swap between y and y0 would
be marginally improving i¤
(xn   y0)2 + (xp   y)2 < (xn   y)2 + (xp   y0)2;
or equivalently
(xn   xp)(y   y0) > 0:
Let us now assume that for some n; @Sn is not convex. Then we can nd
y; y00 2 C(Sn); and  2 (0; 1) such that y0 = y + (1  )y00 =2 C(Sn): Since y
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and y00 are limits of sequences of elements of Sn; we can simply assume they
are themselves interior. Since y0 =2 C(Sn) and C(Sn) is closed, there exists
an interval I 0 = (   ";  + ") such that y0(0) = 0y + (1   0)y00 =2 C(Sn)
for all 0 2 (   ";  + "): Since y; y00 2 Sn; we can construct two intervals
J = (y   ; y + )  Sn and J 00 = (y00   ; y00 + )  Sn and furthermore
choose them such that they do not intersect J 0 = y0(I 0): Finally there exists
a mapping y() from I 0 to J and y00() from I 0 to J 00 which allows us to index
those two sets by 0:
For 0 2 I 0 (y0(0)   y(0))(y0(0)   y00(0)) < 0: Thus, either (xn  
x(y0(0)))(y(0)   y0(0)) > 0 or (xn   x(y0(0)))(y00(0)   y0(0)) > 0: Let
y(0) be the element of fy(0); y00(0)g such that the inequality is satised.
Consider now the new assignment which, for all the 0s, replaces x(y0(0))
with xn and sets x(y(
0)) = x(y0(0)) instead of xn: Each of those swaps is
marginally improving the objective function by an amount which is bounded
from below by a strictly positive number, since there is a nite number of
values of xn and j y0(0) y(0) j is also bounded away from zero. Integrating
those gains over I 0 and noting that y() has full support, we see that the objec-
tive function must improve by a strictly positive amount, which contradicts
the initial optimality condition. Thus C(Sn) must be convex. QED.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 1 implies that any optimummust be a partition by intervals, up to
a set of measure zero. It follows that one cannot improve on such a partition.
By Lemma 2, for any partition the optimal xn must be
yn+yn+1
2
; which proves
(v). Next, computing the value function for such a conguration, we get that
E(x(y)  y)2 = 1
12
N 1X
n=0
(yn+1   yn)3: (13)
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For a given N; we minimize (13) subject to
y0 = 0;
yN = 1;
 
N 1X
n=0
(yn+1   yn) ln(yn+1   yn)  K:
The FOCs are:
(yn yn 1)2 (yn+1 yn)2 = (ln(yn yn 1) ln(yn+1 yn)); 0 < n < N: (14)
Note that absent the capacity constraint, optimality would imply that
yn   yn 1 = yn+1   yn: All intervals would then be of constant length 1=N
and the resulting entropy would be lnN: Thus, if lnN < K; then  = 0
and the optimal solution is the unconstrained one. However, one can always
improve on this by picking a larger N; since the initial conguration can
always be replicated by collapsing the additional interval to a set of measure
zero by equating their bounds. Therefore the optimal N will be such that
lnN  K; i.e. the capacity constraint will be binding. Let us then consider
such an N: Call n the length of interval n: The FOC (14) implies that
2n    lnn is invariant across intervals. Since the function X2    lnX
is U-shaped, n can at most have two values, let us call them  and 0:
Clearly, the invariance property is then satised for  = 
02 2
ln0 ln : Without
loss of generality, assume   0: Let q the number of intervals of length :
Since the whole [0,1] interval must be partitioned, it must be that
q+ (N   q)0 = 1
and
 q ln  (N   q)0 ln0 = K:
Eliminating 0; we get
0 =
1  q
N   q ;
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and we see that  must solve
() =  q ln  (1  q) ln

1  q
N   q

= K: (15)
The function () is increasing and then decreasing and reaches its max-
imum at  = 1=N; at which point we also have 0 = 1=N: Therefore, there
is at most one solution  such that   0: Furthermore, (0) = ln(N   q)
and (1=N) = lnN: Therefore, there exists a solution for  provided
ln(N   q) < K  lnN:
In particular, for any N the set of values of q for which this holds is non
empty.
Despite that q is integer, equation (15) also denes a value of  for any
real number q: Furthermore,
@
@q
= (ln0   ln) +  0 < 0:11
Since 0() > 0; it follows that d
dq
> 0:
Next, note that the resulting loss function, up to a positive multiplicative
constant, is equal to V = q3 + (N   q)03: Di¤erentiating, we get
dV = (3  03)dq   3q02dq + 303dq + 3q2d  3q02d
= (3  03)dq + 302(0   q)dq + 3q(2  02)d:
Since d
dq
> 0,  < 0; and 0 < 1  q; all terms are negative if dq > 0:
Therefore, V is a decreasing function of q; given N; the optimal value of q is
the largest possible one, i.e. q = N   1: The resulting loss function is then
V = (N   1)3 + (1  (N   1))3; (16)
and  now solves
~() =  (N   1) ln  (1  (N   1)) ln (1  (N   1)) = K: (17)
11It can be checked that this expression is always negative by noting that it would be
equal to zero at  = 0 and that its derivative with respect to 0 is =0   1 < 0:
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What is the optimal value of N? First of all, di¤erentiating ~ with respect
to N and  we get
d
dN
=   
N   1(1 +
1
ln0   ln) < 0: (18)
Next, di¤erentiating (16) and using (18) we get that
dV
dN
= 3   302 + 3(02  2)(1 + 1
ln0   ln):
This expression is positive if and only if
22 <
3( +0)(0  )
ln0   ln :
Calling  = 0= > 1; this is equivalent to ln  < 3(2   1)=2; which is
always true.
Thus dV=dN > 0: Consequently, the optimal value of N is the smallest
one such that lnN  K; i.e. N = INT (eK):
QED
Derivation of (2)-(3).
The budget constraint of the individual isZ 1
0
picij +mj  yj + sj;
where yj = pjxj is his income and sj is rebated seignioriage. In equilibrium
the total money stock is M =
R 1
0
mjdj and we assume for simplicity that
seignoriage is rebated proportionally to the value of output produced by the
individual:
sj =M
yj
Y
;8j;
where
Y =
Z 1
0
yjdj
is GDP. Aggregate real output is dened as X =
R 1
0
xj dj
1=
.
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We assume that the money stock is drawn from a distribution with density
f(M) and c.d.f F (M):We also assume that the idiosyncratic shock is drawn
from a distribution with density h(z) and cumulative H(z):
Solving for the consumers optimal consumption and money holdings
yields, after a few steps, the following relationship:
cij =
mj
p
1
1 
i p
  
1 
: (19)
Aggregating across individuals, this gives the demand curve for good i :
Ci =
M
p
1
1 
i p
  
1 
: (20)
We assume that all producers meet demand. Therefore, xj = Cj:Next,
Y =
Z
pjxjdj
=
Z
pjCjdj
= M:
We can also wheck that X =
 R
Ci di
1=
=M=p:
Furthermore, aggregating (19) across goods we see that the aggregate
consumption index for individual j is equal to
cj =
mj
p
:
We also have that
R 1
0
picij = mj = pcj: Substituting into the budget
constraint, we get that
mj =
yj + sj
2
;
cj =
yj + sj
2p
:
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Noting that sj =M
yj
Y
and yj = pjxj we get an indirect utility function
Vj = E ln
"
c
1=2
j

mj
p
1=2
M
p
  
  zjx1+j
#
= E ln
"
pjxj(1 +M=Y )
2p

M
p
  
  zjx1+j
#
(21)
= :E ln
"
pjxj
p

M
p
  
  zjx1+j
#
It is this quantity that the individual maximizes when setting his price
pj subject to the demand curve (20). Substituting this demand curve into
(21) we can rewrite the objective function of the producer as
Vj = E ln
24pj
p
  
1  M
p

M
p
  
  zj M
1+
p
1+
1 
j p
 (1+)
1 
35
= E ln

p
  
1 
j   jp
  1+
1 
j

+ E ln
h
p
2 1
1  + M1  
i
;
where j is dened by (3). This clearly amounts to maximizing (2).
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